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Abstract:
Financial  statements  information  is  supposed  to  influence  the  credit  
decisions of credit institutions. Furthermore, debt agreements include terms based 
upon accounting numbers.  Within this context an accounting choice aiming to  
minimize  tax liability  might  generate significant  non-tax costs for  a firm.  The  
significance of these costs is conditioned upon the level of dependency of firm on 
debt  financing.  This  paper  examines  the  arguments  that  have  been  developed  
regarding the association between firm’s leverage ratio and its accounting policy  
decisions.  Given  the  level  of  dependency  of  Greek  industrial  firms  on  bank 
financing it is argued that the above mentioned factors might affect the accounting  
policy decisions of Greek firms and prompt them to deviate from a tax-reducing  
policy. 
1. Introduction
Firms’  choices  of  reporting  policies  are  conditioned  upon  the  economic 
consequences of the alternative policies (Dhaliwal  et al., 1982). Holthausen and 
Leftwich  argue  that  firms’  choices  of  reporting  policies  have  economic 
consequences when:
“...changes in the rules used to calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution 
of  firm’s  cash  flows,  or  the  wealth  of  parties  who  use  those  numbers  for  
contracting or decision making.” (1983: 77).
In addition, accounting figures influence firm’s cash flows through their impact 
upon company’s tax liability (Wolfson, 1993). This is the case provided that the 
same  accounting  treatment  is  used  for  financial  reporting  purposes  and  tax 
purposes (Cloyd et al., 1996). A tax reducing strategy increases firm’s tax saving 
and consequently has a positive effect on its cash flows. Assuming rationality and 
efficient  capital  markets,  an  accounting  policy  that  minimizes  taxable  income 
should be preferred (Biddle and Lindhall, 1982; Niehaus, 1989). However, given 
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that  the reduction in  firm’s  taxable income is  associated with a corresponding 
decrease  in  its  reported  income,  tax  minimisation  might  have  serious 
consequences for various parties involved within a firm (Scholes et al., 1990). The 
adverse picture of the firm’s financial position that may emerge as a result of a 
decrease in the reported figures might hinder firm’s ability to meet its contractual 
and  regulatory  obligations,  while  shareholders’  and  managers’  wealth  may  be 
affected as well (Matsunaga et al., 1992). The above-mentioned consequences of a 
tax reducing policy are called the “non-tax” costs – or financial reporting costs - 
of that policy. The tax benefits of an accounting choice are supposed to be traded 
off  against  the  non-tax  costs  ensuing  from  it.  The  outcome  of  this  trade-off 
influences firm’s accounting policy decisions.
The role that accounting figures play in firm’s negotiations with the providers 
of credit capital, and the inclusion of accounting numbers-based terms in the debt 
agreements,  suggest that an accounting choice aiming to minimize  tax liability 
might  generate  significant  non-tax costs  for  a firm3.  The  significance of  these 
costs is conditioned upon the level of dependency of firm on debt financing. The 
firm’s leverage ratio it has been hypothesised to be an appropriate proxy for firm’s 
dependency on debt financing (Smith, 1993). This paper examines the arguments 
that have been developed regarding the association between firm’s leverage ratio 
and its accounting policy decisions. Given the level of dependency of Greek firms 
on debt financing it can be assumed that the above mentioned factors might affect 
the accounting policy decisions of Greek firms. The paper discuss the impact that 
the debt-related considerations might have upon the accounting policy decisions of 
Greek industrial firms given the structural characteristics of the Greek business 
environment  in  general,  and the banking sector  in  particular.  It  is  argued that 
firm’s  dependency  on  debt  financing  is  a  factor  that  can  generate  significant 
financial reporting costs for Greek industrial firms and force them to deviate from 
a tax-reducing policy.               
    
2. Financial reporting costs and firm’s dependency on debt financing
The  use  of  accounting  information  by  external  providers  of  capital  can 
generate  important  financial  reporting  costs.  Banks  analyse  accounting 
information before taking a credit-allocation decision (Lev, 1974; Foster, 1986). 
Sengupta (1998) argues that financial accounting information influences banks’ 
credit allocation decisions; while the quality of corporate disclosure has an impact 
upon the firm’s cost of capital.  The impact that accounting numbers might have 
on  banks’  credit  decisions  may  influence  a  firm’s  reporting  policy  decisions 
3 Other factors that influence the balance between tax benefits and non-tax costs are (i) ownership 
structure of the firm, (ii) the impact  of accounting figures on the firm’s capital  value,  (iii) the 
perceptions of external  parties regarding management’s efficiency and ability,  (iv) the various 
regulatory constraints that a firm may face. For further discussion of these factors see, Scholes et  
al., (2005). 
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(Deakin, 1979). Prakash and Rappaport  (1977) and Dirsmith and Lewis (1982) 
argue that managers’ perceptions regarding the impact of accounting information 
on the users of accounts may influence their accounting policy choices (see also 
Wilner, 1982). Within this context, it is reasonable to expect that the tax benefits 
which result from a tax-minimisation policy will be balanced against the potential 
non-tax costs associated with such policy (Wolfson, 1993; Cloyd et al., 1996). As 
Wolfson (1993) argues:
“...while  the  tax  savings  that  result  from  reducing  taxable  income  may  be  
attractive,  the increased costs associated with reporting reduced profitability  to  
capital suppliers typically is not.” (p. 319) 
A conflict  of interests  may arise between shareholders and firm’s 
lenders (Leftwich, 1983). Managers are assumed to “...maximize the value of the 
firm’s stock rather than the value of the firm (debt plus stock).” (Kelly, 1983, p. 
117). They will aim to transfer wealth from lenders to shareholders (Holthausen, 
1981;  Holthausen  and  Leftwich,  1983).  Dividend  policies  and  financing  and 
investment decisions, which take place after the granting of a loan, and have not 
been anticipated or defined in advance, might result in a transfer of wealth from 
lenders  to  shareholders  (Smith  and  Warner,  1979).  Kelly  (1983)  provides  the 
following examples of wealth transfers between the two parties:
“...management may increase dividend payments to shareholders by selling the  
firm’s  assets,  issue  additional  bonds  of  equal  or  higher  priority,  undertake  
investment projects with a variance of return higher than indicated when the debt  
was  issued,  or  reject  with  positive  return  if  the  benefits  would  accrue  to  the  
bondholders.” (p. 117)                                                      
Assuming rational expectations, the providers of debt capital are expected to 
anticipate  these  management  actions,  and  to  value  the  debt  issue  accordingly 
(Holthausen and Leftwich,  1983;  Watts  and Zimmerman,  1986;  Smith,  1993). 
Thus, the managers have an incentive to sign contracts that will convince lenders 
that  actions,  which  may  reduce  the  value  of  the  debt,  will  not  be  undertaken 
(Kelly, 1983). Often, these contracts include provisions, which are expressed in 
accounting terms, and put restrictions on a firm’s investment, financing and other 
operational decisions (see, Dhaliwal, 1980; Holthausen, 1981; Leftwich, 1981, and 
1983;  Gopalakrishan and Parkash,  1995).  For  instance,  minimum requirements 
with respect to the level of working capital, leverage and net worth can limit  a 
firm’s discretion to “...merge,  issue new debt,  or pay a dividend if  leverage is 
above  the  specified  maximum  and/or  working  capital  is  below  the  stated 
minimum.” (Holthausen, 1981, p. 77). If debt covenants are violated, the firm is 
placed in technical default. According to Gopalakrishan and Parkash (1995) the 
consequences of a violation of an accounting-based debt covenant are as follows:
“(a) termination of the lending agreement; (b) demand for immediate repayment  
of the loan; (c) increased collateral; (d) increased interest rate; (e) imposition of  
additional constraints; and (f) waiver of the violation.” (p. 20)
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It seems therefore, that a technical default can cause cash out-flows, which will 
most  probably  generate  stock-price  effects  (Kelly,  1983).  As  a  consequence, 
firms’ shareholders have an incentive to avoid a violation of the terms of debt 
agreements. A similar incentive have the managers of a firm,  since a technical 
default may influence their wealth, through the negative impact it will have on the 
value  of  their  stockholdings,  and  on  the  value  of  their  human  capital  (Kelly, 
1983). Given that the terms of the debt covenants are often expressed on the basis 
of accounting figures, the accounting methods employed can partially determine 
whether a firm is able to meet the debt covenants (Holthausen, 1981; Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1983). It seems, therefore, that a change in an accounting method - 
a mandatory or a voluntary one - can influence the wealth of shareholders and 
lenders (Lys, 1984). 
The cost of a technical violation of a public debt is supposed to be higher then 
the cost of a violation of a private debt, because the cost of renegotiating a public 
debt is supposed to be higher in comparison to the renegotiation of a private one 
(Barrett et al. 1989; and Gopalakrishan and Parkash, 1995). For a renegotiation of 
a publicly issued debt it is required a consent of debt-holders that control at least 
two-thirds  of  the  outstanding  debt,  while  for  the  modifications  of  certain 
specifications  of  the  issuance  the  consent  of  total  number  of  debt-holders  is 
necessary (Smith and Warner, 1979; Dhaliwal, 1980; Smith, 1993). According to 
Smith (1993) the more costly and relatively inflexible process of the renegotiation 
of a publicly-issued debt can lead a firm to a bankruptcy more easily than in the 
case of a private debt.                                    
It  should  be  noticed,  though,  that  a  change  in  accounting  methods  has 
implications with respect to firm’s ability to comply with the terms of lending 
contracts  only  if  the  terms  relating  to  accounting-figures  are  costly  to 
(re)negotiate. As Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) state: “A necessary condition 
for  accounting  changes  to  have  economic  consequences  because  of  lending 
agreements is: it is costly to negotiate and monitor debt agreements, renegotiate 
those  agreements,  and  recapitalize  outstanding  debt.”  (p.  86).  Costless 
(re)negotiations, monitoring and recapitalisations imply that an accounting change 
-  voluntary  and  /  mandatory  -  will  have  no  effect  on  the  terms  of  the  loan 
agreements, since particular accounting rules referring to these terms will be set in 
detail  ex ante (costless negotiation). In the case of a subsequent change, lenders 
and borrowers can neutralise the consequences of the relevant changes by ex post 
adjusting  the  accounting-determined  specifications  of  the  terms  (costless 
renegotiation).  As far  as the costless recapitalisation  of  the debt  concerns,  the 
impact of the alteration in accounting rules can be negated by a repurchase of the 
debt by the debt-issuer, and a subsequent reissue of it, which will incorporate the 
changes in the accounting provisions.  
      It has been hypothesised that firms, which are close to violating restrictive 
accounting-based covenants,  are more  likely to prefer  accounting methods that 
reduce  the  likelihood  of  such  events;  in  these  situations  the  firm  will  choose 
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income-increasing methods (see, Dhaliwal, 1980; Holthausen, 1981; Holthausen 
and Leftwich,  1983; Kelly,  1983; Watts and Zimmerman,  1986; Gopalakrishan 
and Parkash, 1995). The terms of lending agreements can be a determining factor 
in the choice of accounting methods only if the accounting-based provisions of the 
debt  contracts  relate  to  the  generally  accepted  accounting  principles.  As 
Gopalakrishan and Parkash (1995) state: “...if lending agreements do not refer to 
GAAP (or modified GAAP) on a consistent basis, debt covenants per se are not 
likely to be a major factor in accounting choice decisions.” (p. 16). To specify 
particular accounting procedures for an individual debt contract is costly, therefore 
accounting methods employed for measuring the restrictions incorporated in the 
loan agreements are often those determined by the generally accepted accounting 
principles (Holthausen,  1981;  Leftwich,  1983;  Kelly,  1983)  Empirical  research 
provides evidence, which testifies terms of the debt agreements usually refer to 
GAAP (see, Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Gopalakrishan and 
Parkash, 1995).  
However, an accounting-method decision which aims to relax the accounting-
based  constrains  of  a  loan  agreement,  is  most  likely  to  be  associated  with 
important  tax  costs,  since  the  resulting  increased  reported  income  is  likely  to 
generate increased taxable income.  Sweeney (1992)  suggests that,  although the 
adoption  of  an  income-increasing  method  can  delay  the  violation  of  a  debt-
covenant, when the method is likely to result in significant tax costs, a firm may 
to choose the tax-reducing method,  despite  the likelihood of  technical  default. 
Conversely, when a firm is close to violating accounting-based terms of their debt 
covenants, important non-tax costs can arise from the implementation of a tax-
reducing  policy  (see,  Johnson  and  Dhaliwal,  1988;  Matsunaga,  et  al. 1992; 
Wolfson, 1993; Cloyd et al., 1996; Maydew, 1997). 
On the other hand, the link between the technical violation and the choice of 
accounting methods has been questioned. Beneish and Press (1993) argue that a 
technical default is more likely to be associated with deterioration of a firm’s real 
economic circumstances, rather than with a change - voluntary or mandatory - in 
accounting  methods.  They  compared  the  financial  characteristics  of  violating 
against non-violating firms, and they conclude that: “...violators present a profile 
consistent with financial distress. Relative to nonviolators, violators are relatively 
more  leveraged  and  have  lower  liquidity,  profitability,  and  stock  return 
performance.” (Beneish Press, 1993, p. 239). 
Furthermore,  it  has been argued that the consequences of a technical default 
may not be that severe for a violating firm. The results of empirical research have 
not been conclusive. Beneish and Press (1992) investigated the costs of technical 
violation  for  a  sample  of  firms  that  breached  accounting-determined  debt 
covenants.  The  results  suggested  that  a  technical  violation  could  give  rise  to 
important  refinancing  and  restructuring  costs  due  to  the  lenders’  decisions  to 
increase interest  rates  and  to  demand  a partial  or  full  repayment  of  the  loan. 
Furthermore,  it  is  likely  that  in  response  to  covenant  violations,  lenders  will 
impose additional restrictions on the firm. On the other hand, Gopalakrishan and 
Parkash (1995) findings suggest that a waiver of a violation is the more likely 
response to a violation - an outcome that is not so costly for a firm, in comparison 
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with other potential consequences that could have ensued as a result of a technical 
default. 
Consequently, the non-tax costs associated with a tax-minimisation policy may 
not be as important as originally hypothesised, and thus a firm may not forego so 
easily potential tax benefits. However, the waiver of violation is not completely a 
costless result.  Beneish and Press (1992) provide evidence, which suggests that 
although the violation is less costly for firms that can obtain a waiver than for 
those that cannot, waivers are not costless, since borrowers should pay fees and 
concessions to lenders in order to obtain a waiver. Besides, it seems that a waiver 
is  more  likely  to  be  granted  to  a  firm  with  lower  estimated  probability  of 
bankruptcy and a lower leverage ratio, while unsecured or high debt issues are less 
likely to receive a violation waiver (Chen and Wei, 1993).
3. Leverage characteristics and tax planning
It has been argued that the tax-costs might not be particularly significant for the 
firms  that  are  close  to  breach  debt-covenants.  Johnson  and  Dhaliwal  (1988) 
maintain  that  the  economic  conditions,  which  lead  a  firm  towards  a  technical 
default, will have a negative impact on the firm’s effective tax rates. The debt of 
the firm will  have generated tax-shields in the form of high interest  expenses. 
Furthermore,  the adverse economic  conditions are likely to have generated tax 
credits in the form of operating loss carryforwards. These tax credits will limit the 
tax costs that will result from an income-increasing accounting policy. 
An inverse association may exist between the debt-related tax shields and other 
tax-shields,  such  as  investment-related  (e.g.  depreciation).  DeAngelo  and 
Masoulis (1980) suggest that - holding before-tax earnings constant - when a firm 
enjoys  high  investment-related  tax  shields  it  will  issue  less  debt,  because  the 
deductibility of the debt-related tax shields (i.e. interest expenses) will be reduced 
as a consequence of the existence of high investment-related tax shields - and vice 
versa. MacKie-Mason (1990) and Dhaliwal et al. (1992) provide evidence, which 
indicate that firms,  which face a great probability of losing the deductibility of 
their existing tax shields, they are less likely to issue debt. 
The substitution of alternative tax shields will take place providing that firm’s 
earnings are not high enough to allow the simultaneous use of both tax shields. 
Furthermore, the substitution between the debt-related tax-shields and other tax-
shields will take place provided that losses cannot be carried forward. If they can 
be carried forward, the tax shields are not wasted, since they can be used to offset 
taxable income in the future (Dhaliwal  et al.,  1992). Furthermore, for the firms 
with  high  loss-carryforwards,  the  value  of  the  tax  shields  may  decline,  if  the 
operating  income  cannot  “absorb”  all  the  available  tax  shields  (Auerbach  and 
Poterba, 1987, in Feldestein (ed.), 1987). 
When a firm faces huge prior year’s losses - or operating losses - and avoids 
using a tax–shield not only does not waste its tax shields, but also increases the 
total tax savings. When a firm does not use a tax-shield, its operating income rises 
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and can be charged with the losses carried forward from prior years. In that way 
the company writes off  the prior periods’ losses and effectively reduces its tax 
liability. Since the reported profits are charged with losses carried forward, there 
will be no taxable income for the years that such a policy is implemented. After 
the end of that period, the firm can charge its profits with the tax-shield that has 
not used in the previous years. As a result the level of reporting profits and of 
taxable income will be reduced. As Scholes et al. (1990) put it: “…efficient tax-
planning may be very different from tax minimization.” (p.621) 
A similar argument was developed by Bowen et al. (1981), with regard to the 
accounting treatment of the interest costs related with capital expenditures - i.e. 
capitalisation  vs.  expense.  They  argued that,  since  the  expense  of  the  interest 
would result in a reduction of tax liability, it would have been the obvious choice 
from a tax perspective. However, under certain circumstances the capitalisation of 
the interest may constitute an effective tax reducing policy. In particular, a “...firm 
with a tax loss carry forward  or  with a current  operating loss and insufficient 
taxable income in the previous three years to carry back the operating loss may 
prefer to capitalise interest. Under these circumstances, delaying recognition of the 
interest expense prolongs the period over which the expense can be used to reduce 
taxable income.”  (p.  155).  According  to  this  interpretation  the  decision of  the 
more leveraged firms to capitalise interest is dictated by the requirements of a tax-
reducing strategy aiming to substitute tax shields over time. Such an interpretation 
can be perceived as distinct from an interpretation founded upon a tax benefits vs. 
non-tax  costs  analysis.  However,  the  two  interpretations  are  not  necessarily 
incompatible or competing. For heavily indebted firms that benefit from the above 
mentioned  tax  shields,  the  decision  to  capitalise  interest  not  only  leads  to  a 
reduction of their long-term tax liability, but also improves their prospects to raise 
debt capital in favourable terms and to avoid a violation of their debt covenants, 
since they avoid a further deterioration of their financial condition. 
4. Financial reporting costs for firms operating in Greece 
In  Greece  bank financing  constitutes  one  of  the  main  sources  of  funds  for 
private  enterprises.  Thus,  firms  are  expected to  particularly  concern about  the 
impact that accounting figures might have upon banks’ credit decisions. Within 
this  context  a  tax-reducing  accounting  policy  can  generate  significant  non-tax 
costs for the firms. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  could  have  been  argued  that  the  significance  of  the 
financial reporting costs resulting from a tax-reducing policy might be mitigated 
due to the influence of factors that have traditionally characterised the structure of 
the Greek business environment. During the post-war period banks had gradually 
developed  a  close  relationship  with  many  companies,  which  in  certain  cases 
included  an  ownership  of  firms’  share  capital  (OECD,  1995).  Actually,  for 
decades banks have been the main – if not the only – source of finance for most of 
Greek business entities (see, Halikias, 1978; Tsoris, 1984). Until recently equity 
funds  raised  through  capital  markets  played  a  minor  role  in  the  financing  of 
private  enterprises  (OECD,  2001).  The  close  relationship  that  existed  between 
banks and companies might had as a consequence that banks could have obtained 
any  relevant  information  concerning  a  particular  entity,  directly  from  entity’s 
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management, without having to rely upon publicly disclosed data. Furthermore, a 
violation of a debt covenant might not have so serious consequences for a firm. 
Moreover, since most Greek firms usually preferred private debt and very rarely 
issued public debt, the cost of renegotiating a debt was not significant, and as a 
consequence the non-tax costs resulting from a violation of a debt covenant would 
have been limited. 
For decades the banking sector in Greece was dominated by a number of large 
banks, which were under the direct or indirect control of the state (Mpellas and 
Georgopoulos, 2003). It has been argued that the loan granting decisions of the 
state  controlled  banks  have  not  always  been  based  upon  objective  financial 
criteria. Favouritism and clientelistic relationships influenced, in certain cases, the 
loan granting decisions of the state-controlled banks (OECD, 1995; Makridakis et 
al., 1997; Papadogiannis in KATHIMERINI 2005). Consequently, the importance 
of  publicly  disclosed  accounting  information  might  have  been  limited.  Within 
such a context, a tax-reducing strategy would not be likely to generate significant 
non-tax  costs.  The  model  of  industrial  development  which  is  based  upon  the 
financing  of  business  entities  predominantly  by  bank  credit  have  been 
implemented  in  most  continental  countries  in  Europe  in  the  post-war  period. 
Especially in countries where the capital markets were not particularly developed 
the banking system had been the main vehicle for the recycling of savings in the 
economy  (Bellas  and  Sougiannis,  1996).  Regardless  of  its  limitations,  which 
became apparent only recently, this model contributed in the post-war economic 
development  of  Western  Europe.  The  adoption  of  this  model  had  some 
consequences regarding the development  of  financial  accounting in  continental 
Europe. In fact, it has been argued that the fact that financial accounting in many 
European  countries  has  been  dominated  by  tax  regulations  and  has  never 
developed  to  a  genuinely  independent  branch  of  accounting  can  be  partially 
attributed to the fact that when “…even listed companies in continental countries 
are  dominated  by  banks,  governments  or  families,  the  need  for  published 
information is less clear.” (Nobes and Parker, 2000, p. 21). 
Besides the state, though the Central Bank imposed a strict control upon the 
banking system. The imposition of a tight and complex system of credit rules and 
regulations allowed a very limited scope for innovation and modernization, even 
for the banks that were not under the state control (Bellas and Sougiannis, 1996). 
However, during the last fifteen years or so, structural changes have taken place in 
the banking sector that have affected banks’ credit policies, and as a consequence 
might  have  led  to  an  increase  of  the  non-tax  costs  that  firms  might  face.  A 
privatisation  programme  that  has  been  gradually  implemented  during  the  last 
years has as a consequence banks that were previously under the state control, 
passed to  the control  of  the private  sector  (Mpellas and Georgopoulos,  2003). 
Furthermore, even in the case of the banks that continue to be under the direct or 
indirect state control, state’s interference in their management has been loosening 
in the last decade (OECD, 2002). It appears that the implementation of objective 
selection criteria for the granting of loans is the norm even for the state-controlled 
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banks (see,  Emporiki  Bank,  Annual  Report,  2004).  When applying for  a loan, 
companies  are  required  to  meet  some  accounting  numbers-based  criteria.  The 
rules regulating the procedure of granting a loan may provide that the applying 
firms should meet particular criteria regarding the debt/total  assets ratio and/or 
debt/equity ratio, while the total bank-loans should not exceed a particular level. 
Furthermore,  the  debt  agreements  include  similar  accounting-numbers  based 
terms. During the period the loan is outstanding firm’s leverage ratio should not 
exceed a level specified within the debt agreement. The terms of the loan-granting 
agreement often include provisions that forbid a firm to apply for additional loans 
form other banks.
 The most likely outcome of a violation of debt covenant violation is the recall 
of total amount or part of the loan. In many cases, certain conditions relating to 
firm’s  profitability  are imposed.  For instance,  when the level of profits before 
depreciation  and  taxes  fell  below  determined  level  banks  might  demand  a 
considerable increase in the collaterals provided by the enterprises. Within such a 
context  financial  reporting  policy decision that  has an impact  on a number  of 
accounting figures might generate significant non-tax costs. 
A  factor  that  most  likely induced the state-controlled  banks to  abandon the 
older loan-granting policies has been the dramatic intensification of competition 
among the commercial banks during the last 10 years (Mpellas and Georgopoulos, 
2003). A number of dynamic new banks that do not operate under the direct – or 
indirect  –  control  of  the  state  have  entered  the  market  and  have  gained  a 
substantial market share (see, OECD 2001). These banks have adopted objective 
criteria  of  credit  financing  to  private  companies.  Confronted  with  increased 
competition  the  state-controlled  banks  have  preceded  to  reorganisation  their 
activities (see, Emporiki Bank, 2004 Annual Report). Among the measures taken 
has been the rationalisation of  the loan granting evaluation procedure with the 
inclusion of more objective criteria for the credit financing of private companies 
(OECD, 2001).    
Another important development that took place in the banking sector during 
nineties, was Greek banks attempt to internationalise their activities by opening 
branches and / or acquiring banks abroad, especially in the neighbouring Balkan 
countries (OECD, 2001). This effort of expansion is still in process (see Table 1).
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Albania Χ Χ Χ Χ
Bulgaria Χ Χ Χ Χ Χ
F.Y.R.O.M Χ Χ
Romania Χ Χ Χ Χ Χ
Serbia Χ Χ Χ Χ
Source: Annual report of the National Bank of Greece, 2004
 According to the 2004 Annual report of the National Bank of Greece lending 
by Greek banks to Southeastern European countries constitute 4,5 % of the total 
lending, while the profits resulting form their activities in this region constitute 6 
% of their total profits. However, the cost of this expansion was significant and 
had a serious impact upon banks’ financial position and profitability. Among the 
measures taken for improving banks’ financial position has been the upgrading of 
the portfolio of loans granted by the banks. Banks aim to grant loans to clients 
with high level of credit worthiness, while a closer monitoring has been imposed 
upon the existing clients (Emporiki Bank, 2004 Annual Report).  Again, stricter 
accounting numbers-based criteria have been adopted for the loans’ allocation and 
for the monitoring of the debt-agreements.
The  EU  regulations  regarding  banks’  capital  adequacy  ratios  put  further 
pressure to commercial banks to improve the quality of their portfolio of loans, 
and as a consequence prompted them to impose stricter rules regulating the loan-
granting procedures (Gortsos,  1998; OECD, 2001).  The application from 2005 
onwards  of  the  IAS,  which  assign  emphasis  on  the  transparency  and  the  fair 
representation  of  firms’  financial  position,  will  most  likely  provide  additional 
motive to commercial  banks to adopt objective financial criteria for their loan-
granting decisions.
The above-mentioned structural developments in the banking sector not only 
affected banks’ long-granting procedures, but altered their credit policies as well. 
The banks had to readjust the risk composition of their loans. The structure of the 
loans granted by banks to the private sector has dramatically changed during the 
last decade. Total loans given to industry decreased as a percentage of total loans 
granted to private sector from 56 % in 1975 to 40 % in 1990 and 16 % in 2000 
(see, Table 2). 
Table 2. Commercial banks’ credit to industry
Year Credit to industry as 
percentage (%) of total 
to private sector
Long term loans to 
industry as percentage 
(%) of total to industry
Long term loans to 
industry as percentage 
(%) of total to private 
sector
1975 56 19 10
1980 57 22 13
1985 53 25 13
1990 40 23 9
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1995 30 14 4
2000 16 12 2
Source: Bank of Greece Monthly Bulletins 
The “Loans and advances to industry” as a proportion of commercial  banks 
Total  Assets continues to exhibit  a downward trend (see,  Table 3).  During the 
same period the lending to households increased tremendously (OECD, 2002). In 
the period 2000-2005 banks continue to exhibit a tendency of withdrawing from 
financing to industry and preferring the lending to households, while any increase 
in corporate lending is absorbed by commercial enterprises and tourism (National 
Bank of  Greece,  Annual  Report  2004).   The  credit  expansion to  industry was 
weak  during  that  period,  while  in  December  2004  and  in  February  2005  a 
deceleration of credit to industry is recorded. In contrast,  the annual growth of 
credit to households was strong during the period 2000-2005 (see Table 4). Total 
claims on business (loans and bonds) by credit institutions increased by 12,3 % in 
2004 compared with 13,9 % in 2003. Meanwhile, the growth in consumer loans is 
faster, from 24,8 % in 2003 to 37,4 % in 2004. Mortgage loans increased at the 
same pace, i.e. 26,8 % in 2004 compared with 27,1 % in 2003 (Bank of Greece, 
2004).  The  expansion  in  retail  credit  (consumer  loans,  mortgage  loans)  is  a 
strategic choice for Greek Commercial Banks. For instance in the  2004 Annual  
Report of  National  Bank of  Greece is  clearly  stated with respect  to  the credit 
expansion strategy of the bank the emphasis is given in the retail credit (see also, 
Emporiki Bank, 2004 Annual Report). Despite the intense competition, the sector 
of retail credit has the largest growth margins (National Bank of Greece, Annual 
Report 2004). In fact, the increased profitability that Greek banks exhibited in the 
period  2000-2004  is  mainly  attributed  in  the  rapid  expansion  of  retail  credit 
(National Bank of Greece,  Annual  Report  2004; Emporiki  Bank,  2004 Annual 
Report).
   
Table 3. Banks’ credit to industry as a 






Source: Bank of Greece Monthly Bulletins 
These  developments  have  led  to  a  very  extensive  restructuring  of  the  risk 
profile of the funds allocated to private sector, leading to lowering of total risk of 
loans to private sector. As consequence of the above mentioned drastic changes it 
appears  that  the  funds  available  to  private  companies  have  been  dramatically 
reduced. A number of surveys have indicated that one of the major concerns of 
senior managers of Greek firms is the availability of funds for investments (see, 
Hassid, 1997; European Commission, 2002). It is reasonable to assume that the 
available funds would be primarily allocated to firms that have adequate level of 
credit-worthiness,  as  this  is  represented in  the  published  financial  statements. 
Therefore,  corporations  are  expected  to  assign  a  new emphasis  on  accounting 
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figures. As a consequence, when a tax-reducing accounting policy has a negative 
impact  upon  certain  accounting  figures  will  generate  significant  financial 
reporting costs.
A distinct characteristic of the Greek business environment is the preference 
that banks have shown for granting the short-term loans instead of long-term ones, 
even  for  the  financing  of  long-term  investments  in  fixed  capital.  The  greater 
profits  and the  fewer  risks relating  to  short-term  financing  prompted  banks to 
prefer  grand short-tem loans (Halikias,  1978; Tsoris,  1984).  This tendency has 
been intensified in recent years. The long term-loans to industries as a proportion 
of total loans granted to industry decreased substantially during this fifteen years 
period from 23 % in 1975 to 12,5 % in 2000, while long term-loans to industries 
as a proportion of total loans granted to private sector decreased from 10 % in 
1975 to 2 % in 2000 (see Table1). A typical contractual agreement for short-term 
loan provides that banks can recall loans within a short period of time (one year 
maximum),  when contract violations occur. Practically, a waiver of violation is 
not  an  option  for  Greek  private  firms.  It  seems  that  the  consequences  of  a 
violation of a debt covenant can be serious for a firm, increasing in this way the 
non-tax costs resulting from a tax-reducing accounting policy.
  The fact that many private firms have limited access to long-term bank credit, 
have prompted many Greek firms to attempt to raise capital by issuing public debt 
(i.e.  bonds), a practice that,  as mentioned earlier,  was uncommon in the recent 
past (Emporiki Bank, Annual Report, 2004; Bank of Greece, 2005). Given that the 
renegotiation cost of public debt, in case of a violation, is high this development is 
likely to have contributed in a further increase of the non-tax cost that a Greek 
firms might face. 
Table 4. 
Breakdown of Monetary Financial Institutions Credit to Enterprises 
and Households in Greece
Outstanding Annual Percentage Changes
balances on 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
31/12/2004 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 December February
(million euro) 
Industry 15.676 10,2 11,5 10,4 10,2 7,5 1,8 1,1 -1,2 -2
Households 51.636 40 33,1 28,2 17,5 28,9 28,2 28 28,5 28,6
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1. Housing loans 33.127 36,7 35,4 27,1 24,5 24,7 22,9 23,8 24,8 25,4
2. Consumer 
Loans 17.054 44,3 27,4 24,8 29,2 34,5 38,2 37,9 37,4 35
Credit Cards 7.665 62,1 37,1 27,8 24,8 23,3 23,3 23,4 23,2 21,4
Other consumer 
Loans 9.389 31,8 19,2 21,8 33,9 46,9 54,9 53,1 51,7 48,4
3. Other 1.455 165,5 62,6 135,7 119,2 87,5 47,6 18,8 15,9 29,7
Source: Bank of Greece, Annual report of 2004
As  a  result  of  the  above-mentioned  developments,  it  seems  that  Greek 
companies operate within an environment that is likely to generate high financial 
reporting costs. The case of the renegotiation of the debt of the Leader of Textile 
Industries in Greece is illustrative of the impact these developments have upon 
banks credit policies, and indicative of the non-tax costs that Greek firms might 
face. The consortium of banks that had financed the particular group imposed very 
strict conditions for the refinancing of the debt of the group. It should be noted 
that that the three largest state-controlled banks are included in the consortium of 
banks. The banks have the option of the total recall of the loan within a six-month 
period  in  the  of  a  debt-covenant  violation.  Many  of  the  terms  of  the  debt 
agreement  are  accounting–numbers based.  In  addition,  a very tight  monitoring 
mechanism has been imposed upon the group’s policies (see EXPRESS, 2004). 
5. Concluding remarks
This  paper  attempts  to  provide  an  insight  on  the  way  debt-related 
considerations might influence the accounting-policy decisions of Greek industrial 
firms.  In  Greece  tax  accounting  and  financial  accounting  coincide  and  it  is 
expected that tax considerations will influence management’s accounting policy 
decisions. It is argued that non-tax considerations relating to firm’s leverage can 
influence the firms’ accounting-policy decisions and prompt them to deviate from 
a tax-reducing policy. The structural changes that took place in the Greek business 
environment  the last  fifteen years may have increased the role  that accounting 
information  play  in  the  banks’  loan-granting  decisions  and  as  consequence 
increase the non-tax costs that Greek firms might face.    
6. Suggestions for further research  
An  empirical  investigation  is  required  in  order  to  identify  the  way  tax 
considerations  and financial-accounting  policies articulate  with each other,  and 
influence the Greek firms’ accounting policy-decisions. In addition, it should be 
investigated the possibility that the accounting policy decisions might be dictated 
by the requirements of a tax-minimisation strategy based upon the substitution of 
alternative  tax-shields  across  time.  Such  an  interpretation  might  be  plausible, 
given that in Greece many firms are heavily dependent upon debt capital and as a 
consequence they benefit from high debt related tax shields. Further,  in Greece 
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losses can be carried forward for tax purpose for a maximum period of five years, 
therefore firms have an incentive o substitute alternative tax-shields across time.
Such  an  investigation  can  contribute  in  understanding  the  accounting  policy 
decisions of firms operating in an accounting environment that tax accounting and 
financial  accounting  coincide.  The  similarities  of  the  Greek  accounting  and 
business  environment  with  that  of  other  European  countries  means  that  the 
findings  of  such  an  investigation  may  be  of  some  help  in  understanding  the 
accounting policies of firms operating in other countries.      
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